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COMMENT 
FOOD LABELING AND THE CONSUMER’S RIGHT TO 
KNOW: GIVE THE PEOPLE WHAT THEY WANT1 
David Alan Nauheim† 
ABSTRACT 
The average consumer would be surprised to find out that much of the 
food he buys has been irradiated, genetically modified, or cloned, or that it 
contains ingredients not listed on the label. Most consumers would believe 
that they have a “right to know” facts like this about the food they buy. The 
U.S. Supreme Court seems to agree. In 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 
the Court said that: 
The First Amendment directs us to be especially skeptical of 
regulations that seek to keep people in the dark for what the 
government perceives to be their own good. That teaching 
applies equally to state attempts to deprive consumers of 
accurate information about their chosen products: . . . “Some of 
the ideas and information are vital, some of slight worth. But the 
general rule is that the speaker and the audience, not the 
government, assess the value of the information presented.” 
However the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) disagrees. Despite 
strong consumer interest, it refuses to mandate labeling of Genetically 
Modified foods or milk from cows injected with Recombinant Bovine 
Growth Hormone, and it has proposed eliminating mandatory labeling of 
irradiated foods.  
The FDA argues that the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act 
(“FDCA”) does not give the FDA the authority to mandate labeling based 
on consumer interest. This interpretation has been upheld by the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit in Alliance for Bio-Integrity v. Shalala. The 
court upheld the FDA’s interpretation of the FDCA based on the deference 
                                                                                                                           
 1 “Give the People What They Want” is the title of a 1981 album by the English rock 
group The Kinks. 
 † Associate at The Blair Firm, Seattle, Washington; Editor-in-Chief, Liberty 
University Law Review, Volume 3; J.D., Liberty University School of Law, 2009; M.A.T., 
Johns Hopkins University, 2004; B.A., Whitman College, 1996. This Comment is dedicated 
to my wife Colleen, whose love and support have propelled my life to levels I never before 
thought possible. 
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that courts must afford to an agency’s interpretation of its own enabling 
statute. However, the D.C. Circuit did not consider whether consumers have 
a First Amendment right to receive accurate non-misleading information 
about food. Supreme Court jurisprudence suggests that such a right exists. 
This Comment argues that the D.C. Circuit wrongly decided Alliance for 
Bio-Integrity. This Comment argues that the FDA should consider what a 
consumer reasonably wants to know when deciding what kind of 
information a food label must contain. This Comment concludes that the 
best way to vindicate the consumer’s right to know is for Congress to 
amend the FDCA to require that regulators take into account the extent to 
which the labeling fails to reveal material facts that consumers reasonably 
desire.  
Scientists will continue to develop more ways to manipulate food. These 
new technologies will continue to raise religious, moral, ethical, health, and 
safety issues. The consumers’ right to know about their food will be an 
increasingly important issue. While mandatory labeling is often contrary to 
the interests of the food industry, this Comment argues the U.S. 
Constitution has made the choice for us—the First Amendment requires 
that government protect the consumers’ right to receive accurate non-
misleading information that they reasonably desire. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
A health-conscious consumer fills her grocery cart with what she thinks 
is healthy food—milk, corn, salmon, meat, potatoes, canola oil, almonds, 
and spinach. What she does not know is that her “healthy” food includes 
plants that have been genetically modified, a process which may have 
introduced unknown allergens and toxins. She does not know that her 
vegetables have been irradiated with ionizing radiation one million times 
more powerful than medical X-rays, destroying some of the nutritional 
content and causing chemical by-products that might cause cancer. She also 
does not realize that her milk contains antibiotics and growth hormones that 
may threaten her family’s health. She does not know this because the labels 
do not say so. They do not say so because neither federal law nor state law 
requires food labels to contain the kind of information that most consumers 
would want to know.  
This Comment will argue that consumers have a right to know what is in 
their food and that the current statutory and regulatory scheme should be 
amended to protect that right. Part II will set out the justification for the 
consumer’s right to know and give examples of significant facts about food 
that the current regime does not require to appear on labels. Part III will 
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detail the current statutory and regulatory scheme and the case law that 
interprets it. Part IV will demonstrate that the FDA has authority to 
mandate food labeling based solely on the consumer’s right to know, and it 
will also critique lower courts’ decisions failing to require the FDA to so 
mandate. Part V will propose that Congress amend the FDCA so that a label 
will be deemed misleading unless it contains all of the information about a 
food product that an ordinary consumer would want to know. Part V will 
then address anticipated criticisms of that proposal. Part VI concludes this 
Comment. 
II.  BACKGROUND 
A. The Consumer’s Right To Know 
That a consumer has the right to know what is in his food seems so 
evident that it does not need to be supported. However, a consumer’s 
interest is sometimes contrary to the interests of industry and receives little 
weight from labeling regulators.2 Thus, it is necessary to state the 
justification for the consumer’s right to know. 
A consumer’s right to know is a part of a larger concept of health 
freedom. If we do not know what is in our food, how can we make healthy 
food choices?  
At least some of the Founding Fathers were concerned that the 
government would restrict health freedom. Thomas Jefferson believed that 
the people—not the government—should make their own decisions about 
diet and medicine. He wrote, “Was the government to prescribe to us our 
medicine and diet, our bodies would be in such keeping as our souls are 
now.”3 He also believed that government is not an elite group, who should 
decide what is best for society. Instead, the people should be informed so 
that they can make their own choices. He wrote, “I know no safe depository 
of the ultimate powers of the society but the people themselves; and if we 
think them not enlightened enough to exercise their control with wholesome 
                                                                                                                           
 2. “The issue of labeling genetically modified foods is centered on the tension between 
a consumer’s right to know and the bioengineering industry’s interest in not labeling.” 
Matthew Rich, The Debate over Genetically Modified Crops in the United States: 
Reassessment of Notions of Harm, Difference, and Choice, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 889, 
904 (2004). 
 3. THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON STATE OF VIRGINIA 159 (William Peden ed., Univ. of 
N.C. Press 1955) (1853). 
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discretion, the remedy is not to take it from them, but to inform their 
discretion by education.”4  
Dr. Benjamin Rush,5 a physician and a founding father, reportedly 
believed that the U.S. Constitution should contain protections for health 
freedom: 
Unless we put medical freedom into the Constitution, the time 
will come when medicine will organize itself into an undercover 
dictatorship. To restrict the art of healing to one class of men and 
deny equal privileges to others will constitute the Bastille of 
medical science. All such laws are un-American and despotic.6 
Dr. Rush was referring to a monopoly on the practice of medicine, but 
the concept of health freedom—that the people should have the right to 
control their own health choices (and by implication their diet)—was 
implicit in his concern. 
Many judicial pronouncements support the consumer’s right to know. 
Justice Scalia wrote, “The premise of the First Amendment is that the 
American people are neither sheep nor fools, and hence fully capable of 
considering both the substance of the speech presented to them and its 
proximate and ultimate source.”7 Justice Stevens wrote: 
Precisely because bans against truthful, nonmisleading 
commercial speech rarely seek to protect consumers from either 
deception or overreaching, they usually rest solely on the 
offensive assumption that the public will respond “irrationally” 
to the truth. The First Amendment directs us to be especially 
skeptical of regulations that seek to keep people in the dark for 
what the government perceives to be their own good. That 
                                                                                                                           
 4. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Charles Jarvis (Sept. 28, 1820), in 10 THE 
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 161 (Paul L. Ford ed., G. P. Putnam’s Sons 1899). 
 5. Dr. Benjamin Rush was a physician and a signer of the Declaration of 
Independence. BENJAMIN RUSH, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF BENJAMIN RUSH: HIS TRAVELS 
THROUGH LIFE TOGETHER WITH HIS COMMONPLACE BOOK FOR 1789-1813 (Greenwood Press 
1970) (1948). 
 6. The author was unable to locate the exact source of this quotation, but this quotation 
is traditionally attributed to Dr. Rush. See, e.g., Christopher Mills, Comment, Mainstreaming 
the Alternatives When Complementary and Alternative Medicines Become Westernized, 13 
ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 775, 793 (2003). 
 7. McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 258-59 (2003) (Scalia, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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teaching applies equally to state attempts to deprive consumers 
of accurate information about their chosen products . . . .8 
And most famously, Justice Jackson wrote, “If there is any fixed star in our 
constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe 
what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of 
opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.”9 
Three principles are clear in these three pronouncements: 
(1) It is not government’s role to decide what truth is. 
(2) The people are capable of deciding truth themselves. 
(3) Government should not keep information from the people. 
Yet with food labeling policy, the government is doing just that—deciding 
what the truth is and keeping the public in the dark “for their own good.”  
There have been several recent attempts in the U.S. to protect the 
consumer’s right to know. In 1962, President Kennedy sent Congress a 
“special message” declaring four basic consumer rights: the right to safety, 
the right to be informed, the right to choose, and the right to be heard.10 In 
1980, California passed Proposition 65, which requires disclosure of 
carcinogens in consumer products.11 Congress has given teeth to the “right 
to know” in some non-food contexts. For example, the Freedom of 
Information Act requires the U.S. Government to disclose information upon 
a written request, unless one of nine exceptions applies.12 The Emergency 
Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act requires industry to report 
certain spills of toxic chemicals.13  
In the food context, however, consumer rights bills have failed to gain 
traction in Congress.14 Under current federal law, a food label need only 
contain five things: the ingredients, the net weight, the name and address of 
the manufacturer, the name of the food, and certain nutritional 
                                                                                                                           
 8. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 503 (1996) (citations omitted). 
 9. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943). 
 10. Steve Keane, Can a Consumer’s Right to Know Survive the WTO?: The Case of 
Food Labeling, 16 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 291 (2006). 
 11. Safe Drinking Water and Toxic Enforcement Act of 1986, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY 
CODE §§ 25249.5-25249.13 (West 2005). 
 12. Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 1552 (2009) (codified in scattered sections 
of Title 5). 
 13. Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act, 42 U.S.C. § 11021 
(2009). 
 14. See, e.g., Produce Consumers’ Right-to-Know Act, H.R. 1605, 107th Cong. (2001); 
Food Ingredient Right to Know Act, H.R. 1356, 107th Cong. (2001); Genetically Engineered 
Food Right to Know Act, H.R. 5269, 109th Cong. (2006). 
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information.15 Currently, the FDA claims that it does not have authority to 
mandate labeling based on consumer interest alone.16 
B. What You Don’t Know Might Hurt You: Examples of the FDA’s  
Labeling Policy 
This Part will look next at three controversial food technologies and the 
FDA’s response to consumer demands for mandatory labeling of these 
technologies. Each of these food technologies is controversial for either 
safety, health, environmental, ethical, or religious reasons. In each of these 
examples, the FDA has ultimately sided with industry, concluding that there 
are no safety concerns, and that the FDA does not have the authority under 
the FDCA to mandate labeling.  
 1. Genetically Modified Organisms 
Genetically Modified Organism (“GMO”) is the name for what is created 
when a segment of Deoxyribonucleic Acid (“DNA”) from one organism “is 
extracted and spliced into a recipient organism’s preexisting DNA.”17 This 
is done in order to introduce a favorable trait from one organism into 
another.18 DNA “can come from any organism,” whether it is “microbial, 
animal, or plant.”19 Scientists have, for example, developed GMOs that 
resist pests and disease better than conventional crops.20 
Fifty-four percent of Americans say they have never eaten GMOs.21 
However, given that approximately seventy percent of processed foods in 
the U.S. contain GMOs, they are probably mistaken.22 Many Americans are 
                                                                                                                           
 15. See Fred H. Degnan, Biotechnology and the Food Label, in LABELING GENETICALLY 
MODIFIED FOOD, THE PHILOSOPHICAL AND LEGAL DEBATE 17, 18-19 (Paul Weirich ed., 
2007). Mr. Degnan is a partner with King & Spalding, which represents some of the giants 
in the food and pharmaceutical industry—which may explain his sympathy for the FDA’s 
pro-industry policies. Kate & Spalding, Biography of Frederick Degnan, 
http://www.kslaw.com/bio/Frederick_Degnan (last visited Oct. 30, 2009).  
 16. See, e.g., Stauber v. Shalala, 895 F. Supp. 1178, 1193 (W.D. Wis. 1995). This 
Comment will argue that the FDA does have that authority. See infra Part III.B. 
 17. Matthew Rich, supra note 2, at 890. 
 18. Statement of Policy: Foods Derived From New Plant Varieties 57 Fed. Reg. 22,984, 
22,986 (FDA May 29, 1992).  
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. W.K. KELLOGG FOUNDATION, PERCEPTIONS OF THE U.S. FOOD SYSTEM: WHAT AND 
HOW AMERICANS THINK ABOUT THEIR FOOD 18 (2005) [hereinafter KELLOGG REPORT].  
 22. Robert Streiffer & Alan Rubel, Genetically Engineered Animals and the Ethics of 
Food Labeling, in LABELING GENETICALLY MODIFIED FOOD, THE PHILOSOPHICAL AND LEGAL 
DEBATE 61, 66 (Paul Weirich ed., 2007). 
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not aware of this fact, however, because the labels do not tell them—under 
current regulations, GMO labeling is voluntary.23 
Only thirty-two percent of Americans consider themselves 
knowledgeable about GMOs.24 Nevertheless, a plurality (forty-seven 
percent) oppose the introduction of GMOs into the food supply, and a 
majority (fifty-two percent) say they are unlikely to eat GMOs.25 Many 
consumers “are willing to pay [a substantial] premium for non-GM[O] 
foods.”26 While most Americans do not know very much about GMOs, 
GMOs make them “cautious and uncomfortable.”27 
Why are consumers concerned? Some (thirty-seven percent) object to 
GMOs on religious grounds.28 Gene splicing appears to violate Old 
Testament biblical laws.29 Bioengineering also seems to usurp God’s role as 
the Creator.30 Some just think it is immoral to play God with nature.31  
                                                                                                                           
 23. “We are, therefore, reaffirming our decision to not require special labeling of all 
bioengineered foods.” Draft Guidance for Industry: Voluntary Labeling Indicating Whether 
Foods Have or Have Not Been Developed Using Bioengineering; Availability, 66 Fed. Reg. 
4839, 4840 (FDA Jan. 18, 2001). 
 24. KELLOGG REPORT, supra note 21, at 16. 
 25. Id. at 18.  
 26. Philip G. Peters & Thomas A. Lambert, Regulatory Barriers to Consumer 
Information about Genetically Modified Foods, in LABELING GENETICALLY MODIFIED FOOD, 
THE PHILOSOPHICAL AND LEGAL DEBATE 151, 157 (Paul Weirich ed., 2007). 
 27. KELLOGG REPORT, supra note 21, at 17. 
 28. Id. at 21; see Leviticus 19:19 (“Do not mate different kinds of animals.”); 
Deuteronomy 22:9 (“Do not plant two kinds of seed in your vineyard; if you do, not only the 
crops you plant but also the fruit of the vineyard will be defiled.”).  
 29. Leviticus 19:19 (“Do not mate different kinds of animals.”); Deuteronomy 22:9 
(“Do not plant two kinds of seed in your vineyard; if you do, not only the crops you plant but 
also the fruit of the vineyard will be defiled.”). But see Carl Feit, Genetically Modified Food 
and Jewish Law (Halakhah), in GENETICALLY MODIFIED FOODS: DEBATING BIOTECHNOLOGY 
123 (Michael Ruse & David Castle eds., 2002). 
 30. Genesis 1:1 (“In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth.”); see also 
Thomas O. McGarity, Consumer Sovereignty, Federal Regulation, and Industry Control in 
Marketing and Choosing Food in the United States, in LABELING GENETICALLY MODIFIED 
FOOD, THE PHILOSOPHICAL AND LEGAL DEBATE 128, 134 (Paul Weirich ed., 2007). But see 
Joe N. Perry, Genetically Modified Crops, in GENETICALLY MODIFIED FOODS: DEBATING 
BIOTECHNOLOGY 115, 115-21 (Michael Ruse & David Castle eds., 2002). 
 31. See, e.g., HRH The Prince of Wales, Reith Lecture 2000, in GENETICALLY MODIFIED 
FOODS: DEBATING BIOTECHNOLOGY 11 (Michael Ruse & David Castle eds., 2002). 
The idea that there is a sacred trust between mankind and our Creator, under 
which we accept a duty of stewardship for the earth, has been an important 
feature of most religious and spiritual thought throughout the ages. Even those 
whose beliefs have not included the existence of a Creator have, nevertheless, 
adopted a similar position on moral and ethical grounds. 
Id. at 12. 
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Most (seventy-one percent), however, say that their view of GMOs is 
determined by GMOs’ effect on their family.32 This may be an expression 
of concern about the safety of GMOs; twenty-seven percent of consumers 
believe that GMOs are “unsafe,” and forty-two percent express “no 
opinion” on the question.33 
The FDA states that it is “not aware of any information showing that 
foods derived by [bioengineering] . . . present any different or greater safety 
concern than foods developed by traditional plant breeding.”34 However, 
given the government’s track record on protecting consumer safety, 
consumers can be forgiven for having a “well-founded skepticism” of the 
FDA’s assurance.35 
Critics point out that the FDA’s claim that “there is no evidence of an 
adverse effect” is not the same as stating “there is no effect.”36 Critics also 
point out that researchers who dare to publish studies contrary to the 
commercial interest of industry do so at great peril.37 Ironically, at the same 
time that the FDA declared the “safety” of GMOs, it also admitted that it 
was “unaware of any practical method to predict or assess the potential for 
new proteins in food to induce allergenicity . . . .”38  
                                                                                                                           
 32. KELLOGG REPORT, supra note 21, at 22. 
 33. Id. at 18. 
 34. Statement of Policy: Foods Derived From New Plant Varieties, 57 Fed. Reg. 22,984, 
22,991 (FDA May 29, 1992). 
 35. McGarity, supra note 30, at 133. “A consumer who knows nothing about genetic 
engineering may know a lot about how ‘miracle’ drugs have caused catastrophic injuries, 
how nuclear power created a legacy of radioactive waste, and how the kudzu plan that was 
imported as an erosion control tool has taken over the rural South.” Id.; see also Int’l Dairy 
Foods Ass’n v. Amestoy, 92 F.3d 67, 76-77 n.2 (2d Cir. 1996) (Leval, J., dissenting) 
(“[T]here are many possible reasons why a government agency might fail to find real health 
risks, including inadequate time and budget for testing, insufficient advancement of 
scientific techniques, insufficiently large sampling populations, pressures from industry, and 
simple human error. . . . In studying the frequency and seriousness of risks identified after 
approval, GAO found that of the 198 drugs approved by FDA between 1976 and 1985 for 
which data were available, 102 (or 51.5 percent) had serious postapproval risks, as 
evidenced by labeling changes or withdrawal from the market.”). 
 36. Carl Cranor, Different Conceptions of Food Labels and Acceptable Risks, in 
LABELING GENETICALLY MODIFIED FOOD, THE PHILOSOPHICAL AND LEGAL DEBATE 201, 206 
(Michael Ruse & David Castle eds., 2002). 
 37. See, e.g., STEVEN P. MCGRIFFEN, BIOTECHNOLOGY: CORPORATE POWER VERSUS THE 
PUBLIC INTEREST 56-62 (2005) (detailing the intimidation, vilification, abuse, and ostracism 
of researchers who dare to challenge industry, as well as the immense influence industry 
wields over universities). 
 38. 57 Fed. Reg. at 22,987. 
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Critics also point out that food regulators do not require extensive testing 
of GMOs, as they do for chemical additives.39 Instead, food regulators 
“[rely] on the doctrine of “substantial equivalence” to bypass the need for 
extensive testing.”40 Essentially, the FDA “concluded that if a [GMO] is 
“substantially equivalent” to a non-GMO food that has a history of safe use, 
the [GMO] should not be regulated any more stringently” than the non-
GMO food “simply because it is a product of bio-technology.”41 This policy 
is based on the assumption (instead of requiring evidence) that if a gene 
was safe in one plant, it “will be safe when transferred” via biotechnology 
“to another plant.”42 
Critics respond that GMOs are “sui generis,” and they therefore reject 
the FDA’s substantial equivalence theory.43 They point out that the 
regulators are charged with promoting U.S. agricultural products as well as 
regulating them.44 This conflict of interest calls into question the regulator’s 
judgments about “equivalence” and “substantiality.”45 The Department of 
Agriculture has spent $250 million to develop and promote agricultural 
biotechnology, and only $1.6 million—less than one percent of the total—
“was put into assessing the risks.”46  
In fact, there are valid reasons to be concerned about the safety of 
GMOs. When genes are spliced to create GMOs, unexpected toxins or 
allergens can be created.47 “Genetic engineering crosses genes between 
unrelated species” that would not, and could not, crossbreed in nature.48 It is 
difficult to know “whether a protein introduced into a food by genetic 
engineering is a potential allergen.”49 Unforeseen, harmful mutations are 
                                                                                                                           
 39. McGarity, supra note 30, at 131. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Cranor, supra note 36, at 201. 
 43. McGarity, supra note 30, at 131. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. MARK SCHAPIRO, EXPOSED: THE TOXIC CHEMISTRY OF EVERYDAY PRODUCTS AND 
WHAT’S AT STAKE FOR AMERICAN POWER 90 (2007). 
 47. See, e.g., Alliance for Bio-Integrity v. Shalala, 116 F. Supp. 2d 166, 170 (D.D.C. 
2000). 
 48. Brian Tokar, Genetic Engineering Is Too Dangerous to Be Used in Human Foods, 
in FOOD: CURRENT CONTROVERSIES 120, 120 (Jan Grover ed., 2008).  
 49. Bob B. Buchanan, Genetic Engineering and the Allergy Issue, in GENETICALLY 
MODIFIED FOODS: DEBATING BIOTECHNOLOGY 213, 214 (Michael Ruse & David Castle eds., 
2002). 
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more likely to occur with bioengineering than with traditional 
crossbreeding.50 
In one case, soya beans crossed with brazil nuts caused “allergic 
reactions in people sensitive to the nuts.”51 In another case, over 37 people 
were killed and 1500 were permanently disabled by a disease outbreak 
traced to a food supplement produced with GMO bacteria.52 The food 
supplement contained less than 0.1% of the toxic compound.53 The U.S. 
Government declared that the GMO was not the cause, but the company 
involved blamed the GMO because the toxin was never found in the 
company’s non-GMO version of the product.54 
Changes in toxicity are also a concern. GMOs are sometimes specifically 
engineered to maximize their toxicity.55 For example, it is considered 
desirable to make certain crops toxic to harmful pests.56 It is not hard to 
imagine that this toxicity could also be a safety concern to humans.57 Also, 
bioengineering can “inadvertently produce a plant in which the levels or 
bioavailability of important nutrients are altered in significant ways that 
could be harmful to human health.”58  
Some consumers oppose GMOs because of their risk to the environment. 
GMOs, through cross-fertilization, cross-pollinate indigenous native plants, 
diminishing biodiversity.59 Cross-pollination from GMOs also threatens 
organic farmers. Once an organic crop is cross-pollinated with GMOs, it 
cannot be sold under an organic label. An organic farmer whose crop is 
crossbred with GMOs can no longer market his crop as organic, which 
destroys his investment and can result in financial disaster.60  
Another concern is that an herbicide-resistant/pest-resistant GMO could 
crossbreed with a weed, creating an unstoppable “super-weed.”61 
Herbicide-resistant GMOs also raise another concern. The ability to clear 
fields of all weeds using herbicides that can be sprayed directly on 
                                                                                                                           
 50. Peters & Lambert, supra note 26, at 168. 
 51. Tokar, supra note 48, at 120. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. McGarity, supra note 30, at 130. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at 132-33. 
 60. See, e.g., SCHAPIRO, supra note 46, at 87-88. 
 61. Norman C. Ellstrand, When Transgenes Wander, Should We Worry?, in 
GENETICALLY MODIFIED FOODS: DEBATING BIOTECHNOLOGY 325, 326 (Michael Ruse & 
David Castle eds., 2002). 
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herbicide-resistant GMOs will result in farmlands devoid of wildlife, 
jeopardizing birds and plants that depend on farmland for habitat.62 
Perhaps the most frightening environmental threat from GMOs is the 
possibility that a virus will be inadvertently inserted into a GMO, resulting 
in a super-virus that could wipe out crops or cause human and animal 
disease of tremendous power.63 
Ironically, despite the benefits of GMOs touted by their proponents, 
GMOs have proven a financial disaster for American farmers. American 
agriculture, once called the “breadbasket of the world,” could now be called 
a “basket case.” In 1996, prior to the widespread introduction of GMOs, the 
U.S. exported 3.15 million metric tons of corn to the (then) fifteen member 
states of the European Union (“EU”).64 In 2005, that number had dropped 
to 33,000 metric tons—a ninety percent reduction. As less corn is exported, 
inventory of unsold corn rises, resulting in reduced corn prices.65 By one 
estimate, American corn farmers are losing at least $200 million a year.66 
As prices drop, farmers are compensated, at least in part, by $35 billion 
in subsidies provided by the Commodity Credit Corporation.67 This 
amounts to a personal subsidy by every American to the biotechnology 
industry.68 
Concern about GMOs caused the EU and the United Kingdom to put a 
moratorium on GMOs in 1996.69 Today the EU requires labeling for any 
food in which 0.9% of the ingredients have been genetically engineered.70 
Some nations have rejected food aid out of concern that it may contain 
GMOs.71 
Clearly, consumers have valid reasons to reject GMOs. Should food 
containing GMOs say so on the label? In one poll, ninety-three percent of 
                                                                                                                           
 62. Tokar, supra note 48, at 122. 
 63. Id. 
 64. SCHAPIRO, supra note 46, at 98-99. 
 65. Id. at 99. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 100. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Jamie E. Jorg Spence, Right To Know: A Diet of the Future Presently Upon Us, 39 
VAL. U. L. REV. 1009, 1023-24 (2005). 
 70. Commission Regulation 1829/2003, 2003 O.J. (L 268), Genetically Modified Food 
and Feed, 2003 O.J. (L 268), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/ 
LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2003:268:0001:0023:EN:PDF (last visited Nov. 6, 2009). 
 71. Both India and Zambia have rejected food aid from the U.S. because it may be 
contaminated with GMOs. Dinesh C. Sharma, India’s Poor Don’t Need GM Aid, BANGKOK 
POST (Mar. 13, 2003), available at http://www.agbioworld.org/newsletter_wm/index.php? 
caseid=archive&newsid=1611 (last visited Nov. 6, 2009). 
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respondents thought that the government should require that GMOs be 
labeled.72 While the long-term impacts of GMOs are not yet known, must 
consumers wait until there is proof sufficient to satisfy the FDA before they 
have a right to know of the presence of GMOs in their food?73 Or is the 
mere possibility of harm enough to justify a consumer’s right to know?74 
Would not the risk of consuming GMOs be more reasonable if it was done 
knowingly?75 An act that would require mandatory labeling of GMOs failed 
to gain support in Congress.76 However, this Comment argues that 
consumers—not the FDA—should be allowed to decide for themselves. 
 2. Irradiated Foods 
Irradiated food is what it sounds like—food that has been bombarded 
with ionizing radiation.77 High-energy gamma rays, electron beams, or X-
rays, millions of times more powerful than standard medical X-rays, break 
apart the bacteria, such as E. coli, that are sometimes found in food.78 
Irradiation also destroys vitamins and minerals and kills all living cells in 
the irradiated food.79 
While irradiated food is not radioactive, eating irradiated foods can have 
effects that mimic those of actual radiation exposure.80 Irradiation can 
create mutagens.81 Mutagens can cause gene mutations, polyploidy (an 
abnormal condition in which cells contain more than two sets of 
chromosomes), chromosome aberrations (often associated with cancer), and 
                                                                                                                           
 72. McGarity, supra note 30, at 138. 
 73. Peters & Lambert, supra note 26, at 168-69. 
 74. “Vermont need not, furthermore, take the position that rBST is harmful to require its 
disclosure because of potential health risks. The mere fact that it does not know whether 
rBST poses hazards is sufficient reason to justify disclosure by reason of the unknown 
potential for harm.” Int’l Dairy Foods Ass’n v. Amestoy, 92 F.3d 67, 76 n.2 (2d Cir. 1996) 
(Leval, J., dissenting). 
 75. “A person’s voluntary embracing of a risky activity or exposure tends to make the 
exposure or activity acceptable.” Cranor, supra note 36, at 212. 
 76. Genetically Engineered Food Right to Know Act, H.R. 5269, 109th Cong. (2006), 
available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/billtext.xpd?bill=h109-5269 (last visited Nov. 
6, 2009). 
 77. CHRISTINE HOZA FARLOW, D.C., FOOD ADDITIVES: A SHOPPER’S GUIDE TO WHAT’S 
SAFE & WHAT’S NOT 22 (rev. ed. 2007). 
 78. The Center for Food Safety, Food Irradiation, http://truefoodnow.org/ 
campaigns/food-irradiation (last visited Nov. 5, 2009). 
 79. FARLOW, supra note 77, at 22. 
 80. Id. 
 81. The Center for Food Safety, supra note 78. 
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dominant lethal mutations (a change in a cell that prevents it from 
reproducing in humans cells).82 Also, many mutagens are carcinogens.83 
The irradiation process also causes chemical reactions that produce 
benzene and formaldehyde, chemicals that are suspected of causing cancer 
and birth defects.84 Another study linked colon tumors in lab rats to a 
chemical only found in irradiated food.85 In another study, irradiation of 
fruit juices caused low-level production of furans, which are similar to 
cancer-causing dioxin.86 The FDA has never tested the safety of these 
byproducts.87 
Irradiation can also diminish vitamin content of food.88 For example, 
irradiation can destroy up to eighty percent of vitamin A in eggs, up to 
ninety-five percent of vitamin A and lutein in green beans, and forty 
percent of beta-carotene in orange juice. Perhaps it is not surprising, then, 
that studies show that lab animals fed irradiated food experience stunted 
growth.89 Irradiation also doubles the amount of trans fat in beef.90 
While irradiation may reduce unwanted pathogens in food, it does not 
address the underlying problem—the unsanitary food production that 
introduces those pathogens.91 In fact, some critics argue that irradiation 
actually creates a disincentive for producers to worry about contamination 
prevention, since it allows them to mask the unsanitary practices of factory 
farms.92  
In 1986, the FDA decided to require labeling of all irradiated foods.93 
The decision, it made clear, was “not based on any concern about the safety 
of the uses of radiation that are allowed under this final rule.”94 The FDA 
apparently is not concerned by a number of studies showing the harmful 
                                                                                                                           
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id.  
 90. Id.  
 91. Marion Nestle, New Technologies Supplant Old Precautions with High-Tech 
Shortcuts, in FOOD: CURRENT CONTROVERSIES 102, 107 (Jan Grover ed., 2008). 
 92. The Center for Food Safety, supra note 78, at 2. 
 93. Irradiation in the Production, Processing, and Handling of Food, 51 Fed. Reg. 
13,376, 13,388 (FDA Apr. 18, 1986). 
 94. Id. 
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effects of irradiation on food.95 Instead, the FDA based the decision on the 
fact that “consumers view such information as important . . . .”96 The FDA 
noted, “The large number of consumer comments requesting retail labeling 
attest to the significance placed on such labeling by consumers.”97 It is 
important to note that later, the FDA would claim that it did not have 
authority under the FDCA to mandate labeling solely on the basis of 
consumer interest.98 
In 2007, the FDA proposed to change its rule on the labeling of 
irradiated food.99 Under the proposed rule, irradiated food would not need 
to be labeled unless the irradiation “cause[d] a material change in a food’s 
characteristics.”100 For example, if irradiation extended a food’s shelf life 
by delaying ripening, the food would have to be labeled.101 The FDA did 
not propose to require labeling unless the change in the irradiated food was 
not “within the range of characteristics ordinarily found in such foods.”102 
The FDA also proposed to allow irradiated foods to be labeled with the 
term “pasteurized.”103 This is ironic, since the FDA once argued that 
labeling irradiated food as “pasteurized” would be “misleading.”104 The 
FDA’s Orwellian explanation was that while past labeling policy focused 
on conveying to consumers whether a food had been processed, today the 
focus is on the results of the processing rather than the processing itself.105 
This rationale rings somewhat hollow. Consumers have long shown an 
interest in whether products have been produced in accordance with their 
political and social beliefs.106 Hence, there are labels declaring: “Dolphin 
                                                                                                                           
 95. For a compilation of negative irradiation research, including one 1968 FDA study 
where irradiated food caused internal bleeding in rats, see Dr. Joseph Mercola, The Problems 
with Irradiated Food: What the Research Says, http://www.mercola.com/article/irradiated/ 
irradiated_research.htm (last visited Nov. 5, 2009). 
 96. 51 Fed. Reg. at 13,388. This decision is discussed more fully infra Part III.B. 
 97. 51 Fed. Reg. at 13,388. 
 98. See infra Part III.B. 
 99. Irradiation in the Production, Processing and Handling of Food, 72 Fed. Reg. 
16,291, 16,294 (FDA proposed Apr. 4, 2007). This is a change from the stance previously 
taken by the Food Safety and Inspection Service of the FDA, which held that food  
irradiation was a “material fact” that must be reflected on the label. Irradiation of Meat Food 
Products, 64 Fed. Reg. 72,150, 72,157 (FDA Dec. 23, 1999). 
 100. 72 Fed. Reg. at 16,294. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 16295. 
 103. Id.  
 104. Irradiation of Meat Food Products, 64 Fed. Reg. 72,150, 72,158 (FDA Dec. 23, 
1999). 
 105. 72 Fed. Reg. at 16,295. 
 106. Peters & Lambert, supra note 26, at 171. 
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Safe Tuna,”107 “No Animal Testing,”108 “No HFCs,”109 and “Conflict Free 
Diamonds.”110 
While the safety of irradiated foods is debatable, consumers are justified 
in wanting to know whether their food has been irradiated. If the FDA does 
not require labeling of irradiated food, consumers will not have a realistic 
means of avoiding it. Again, the government has decided what is safe and is 
keeping the consumer in the dark. 
 3. Recombinant Bovine Growth Hormone 
Recombinant Bovine Growth Hormone (“rBGH”) is a synthetic hormone 
given to milk cows to increase their milk output.111 It is the synthetic 
version of bovine somatotrophin (“bST”), a naturally occurring bovine 
growth hormone produced in the pituitary gland of all cattle.112 A typical 
dairy cow’s output can be increased by as much as twenty percent a day 
when injected with rBGH.113 The FDA argues that milk from cows that 
have been given rBGH is indistinguishable from rBGH-free milk.114 
However, there is mounting research that rBGH is not safe.115  
rBGH’s adverse effects on cows were described by the court in Stauber 
v. Shalala: 
                                                                                                                           
 107. Tuna labeled as “Dolphin Safe Tuna” was caught using methods that do not harm 
dolphins. Dolphin Safe Tuna, http://www.earthisland.org/dolphinSafeTuna/consumer/ (last 
visited Nov. 5, 2009). 
 108. This label purports to inform the consumer that the product has not been tested on 
animals. While some consumer groups are skeptical of this claim, it does show that 
consumers have ethical concerns about their products. Bornfreeusa.org, What Do These 
Labels Really Mean?, http://www.bornfreeusa.org/articles.php?more=1&p=451 (last visited 
Nov. 5, 2009).  
 109. The “No HFC” label indicates that the producer uses alternative refrigerants that do 
not contribute to global warming. Benjerry.com, Ben and Jerry’s: The Cleaner, Greener 
Freezer, http://www.benjerry.com/activism/environmental/hc-freezer (last visited Nov. 6, 
2009). 
 110. A diamond is a “Conflict-Free Diamond” if its profits are not used to fund war, and 
if it is mined and produced under ethical conditions. The Conflict-Free Diamond Council, 
http://www.conflictfreediamonds.org/learnmore.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2009). 
 111. Int’l Dairy Foods Ass’n. v. Amestoy, 92 F.3d 67, 69 (2d Cir. 1996). Recombinant 
Bovine Growth Hormone (“rGBH”) is also known as Recombinant Bovine Somatotropin 
(“rBST”). Id. 
 112. Stauber v. Shalala, 895 F. Supp. 1178, 1183 (W.D. Wis. 1995). 
 113. Christina Cusimano, Comment, RBST, It Does a Body Good?: RBST Labeling and 
the Federal Denial of Consumers’ Right to Know, 48 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1095, 1098-99 
(2008). 
 114. Id. at 1096. 
 115. Id. at 1099-1105. 
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Use of [rBGH] may affect cows adversely in several ways. 
[rBGH] increases the risks of reduced pregnancy rates, ovarian 
cysts and uterine disorders, decreased lengths of gestation 
periods and lower birth weight of calves. [rBGH] increases the 
risk of retained placentas and twinning rates in cows. It may 
cause increased bovine body temperatures, indigestion, bloating, 
diarrhea, enlarged hocks, enlarged lesions and injection site 
swellings. Additionally, use of [rBGH] increases the risk of 
clinical and subclinical mastitis, a bacterial infection of the 
udder. In absolute terms, [rBGH] increases the risk of mastitis by 
about 0.1 case per cow per year. This risk is less than the risk of 
mastitis posed by seasonal change.116  
The FDA claims that there are no adverse affects to humans.117 However, 
the General Accounting Office (“GAO”) has expressed concern that rBGH 
can indirectly lead to an increase in antibiotic residue in milk.118 This risk 
arises because rBGH increases the risk of mastitis,119 cows with mastitis are 
given antibiotics,120 and this “may lead to high levels of antibiotic residue in 
milk,” not to mention increased pus content.121  
Critics are also concerned that humans will have allergic reactions to the 
increased antibiotics.122 They are also wary about the decreased potency of 
antibiotics, such as penicillin, due to an acquired resistance from exposure 
to such antibiotics.123 Farmers use over fifty different kinds of antibiotics to 
treat mastitis, some of which are not approved for dairy cows.124 The GAO 
has concluded that there is no way to assess the degree to which current 
milk supplies are contaminated by these drugs.125 The GAO ultimately 
recommended that approval of rBGH be withheld until the mastitis issue 
could be resolved.126 
                                                                                                                           
 116. Stauber, 895 F. Supp. at 1183.  
 117. Id. at 1185. 
 118. Cusimano, supra note 113, at 1100. 
 119. Id. One study showed that rBGH increased the risk of mastitis by 25%; another 
showed the increase to be 79%. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. at 1101. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Stauber v. Shalala, 895 F. Supp. 1178, 1184 (W.D. Wis. 1995). 
 125. Id. 
 126. “The increased milk production triggered by the [rBGH] has lead to an outbreak of 
mastitis among cows, and increased residues of the antibiotics used to treat this condition 
could be showing up in milk and beef. Also, food products from cows treated with the 
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rBGH also poses a second threat to human health: insulin-like growth 
factor (“IGF-1”).127 
[IGF-1] is [a] protein hormone whose production is regulated at 
least in part by [bST]. It has the same biochemical composition 
in humans and cows and is present in all milk, human saliva and 
human digestive juices. [rBGH] increases the amount of IGF-1 
in milk. IGF-1 is [removed] in the process of making baby 
formula, but it is not destroyed by pasteurization.128 
Monsanto, the maker of rBGH, has not conducted any long-term studies on 
the effect of increased levels of IGF-1 on humans.129 Nevertheless, FDA 
concluded that the small amount of IGF-1 in cow’s milk from rBGH was 
unlikely to affect humans.130 
Whether out of concern either for human health or for the effect on cows, 
consumers have valid reasons to want to know whether their milk was 
produced with rBGH.131 Yet under current FDA regulations, rBGH labeling 
is voluntary.132 The FDA reasons that “there [is] no significant difference 
between milk from treated and untreated cows and, therefore, . . . under the 
[FDCA] the agency did not have the authority . . . to require special 
labeling . . . .”133 
Amazingly, the FDA concluded that consumer’s religious concerns 
about GMOs were invalid.134 It recognized that “for religious or cultural 
reasons, consumers are interested in being able to identify the source of a 
                                                                                                                           
hormone have been commercially processed and sold to consumers without any warning 
labels.” Summary of the Government Accountability Office’s Report to Congress, Bovine 
Growth Hormone: FDA Approval Should Be Withheld Until the Mastitis Issue Is Resolved 
(Aug. 6, 1992), available at http://www.gao.gov/products/PEMD-92-26 (last visited Nov. 5, 
2009). 
 127. Cusimano, supra note 113, at 1102. 
 128. Stauber, 895 F. Supp. at 1185. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. For a summary of other research about the danger of rBGH, see Streiffer & 
Rubel, supra note 22, at 73. 
 131. See, e.g., CenterforFoodSafety.com, rBGH/rBST, http://www.centerforfoodsafety. 
org/rbgh2.cfm (last visited Dec. 18, 2008) (“CFS seeks to force the FDA to remove rBGH / 
rBST from the market through all available legal means.”). 
 132. Interim Guidance on the Voluntary Labeling of Milk and Milk Products from Cows 
That Have Not Been Treated with Recombinant Bovine Somatotropin, 59 Fed. Reg. 6279 
(Feb. 10, 1994). To this author’s knowledge, no milk producer has yet voluntarily labeled its 
milk, “Contains rBGH!” 
 133. Id. 
 134. Food Labeling; Foods Derived From New Plant Varieties, 58 Fed. Reg. 25,837, 
25,838 (FDA Apr. 28, 1993). 
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protein hydrolysate and determined that for these consumers the protein 
source of a protein hydrolysate is a material fact.”135 However, the FDA 
reasoned that for scientific reasons, those religious concerns were invalid:  
When using recombinant DNA techniques, scientists do not 
infuse the plant with the original genes that were removed from 
the animal. The animal genes are used to produce copies in the 
laboratory. Once the copies are transferred to the plant, they 
become an integral part of its genetic information, just like 
thousands of other genes that are present in the plant 
chromosome. There is a scientific basis to conclude that such 
genetic alterations do not change the essential nature of the plant, 
nor do they confer “animal-like” characteristics to the plant.136 
Thus, the FDA purports to decide what is of religious concern, and what is 
not. In 2000, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia held that 
the FDA’s GMO policy did not violate the First Amendment because it was 
a neutral law of general applicability.137 However, one wonders whether the 
FDA’s reasoning could survive the so-called Lemon Test, which prohibits 
“excessive government entanglement with religion.”138 
Many milk producers, responding to consumer demand for milk free 
from artificial hormones, have labeled their milk “No Artificial Growth 
Hormones.”139 Monsanto responded to the emerging threat by lobbying 
states to ban “rBGH-free” labeling.140 Monsanto argues that such labeling is 
misleading because it implies that milk produced with rBGH is inferior.141 
                                                                                                                           
 135. Id. (citation omitted). 
 136. Id. at 25,839. 
 137. Alliance for Bio-Integrity v. Shalala, 116 F. Supp. 2d 166 (D.D.C. 2000); see infra 
Part III.C.4. The Religious Freedom Restoration Act provides that “Government may 
substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that application of 
the burden to the person[] is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and[] is 
the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.” 42 U.S.C. § 
2000bb-1 (1993). 
 138. “First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or 
primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion, finally, the statute 
must not foster ‘an excessive government entanglement with religion.’” Lemon v. Kurtzman, 
403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) (citations omitted). 
 139. See, e.g., CSMonitor.com, “Hormone-Free” Milk Spurs Labeling Debate: Some Say 
Chemical Company is Behind Efforts To Sink “rBGH-Free” Milk Choice, 
http://www.csmonitor.com/Environment/2008/0421/p13s01-sten.html. A label that declares 
what a food does not contain is called “absence labeling.” “Fat free” and “cholesterol free” 
are examples of absence labeling. 
 140. Andrew Martin, Fighting on a Battlefield the Size of a Milk Label, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 
9, 2008, at BU-7. Monsanto hired a Colorado consultant to form the group American 
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In Pennsylvania, Monsanto succeeded in persuading the legislature to 
ban “rBGH-free” labeling.142 Public outcry was so pronounced that the 
legislature reversed itself just one month later.143 Nevertheless, other states 
have followed or are following suit. Ohio’s “no rBGH” labeling ban is the 
subject of a legal challenge.144 Indiana and New Jersey have similar bans 
under consideration in their legislatures.145  
Ironically, while states move to ban “rBGH-free” labeling, and the FDA 
declares rBGH to be “safe,” Congress’s newly revamped cafeteria proudly 
boasts “hormone-free milk.”146 Restaurant Associates, the manager of the 
congressional cafeteria, explained on its web site that “Recombinant bovine 
                                                                                                                           
Farmers for the Advancement and Conservation of Technology (“AFACT”), which lobbies 
legislatures to ban or restrict labels that indicate milk comes from untreated cows. AFACT 
claims to be led by dairy farmers, but it was funded and initiated by Monsanto. 
 141. Id. This argument has also been made by the FDA. Interim Guidance on the 
Voluntary Labeling of Milk in Milk Products from Cows That Have Not Been Treated with 
Recombinant Bovine Somatotropin, 59 Fed. Reg. 6279 (FDA Feb. 10, 1994). However, this 
is a dubious argument in light of Tylka v. Gerber, No. 96 C 1647, 1999 WL 495126 (N.D. 
Ill. 1999). In that case, plaintiffs argued that Gerber’s claims, including “Nutritionally, you 
can't buy a better baby food than Gerber” were false and misleading advertising, since 
Gerber was using ingredients, such as starch and sugar, which rendered their products less 
nutritious than other brands. Id. at *2. The court held: 
Nutrition is a nebulous concept, although quantifiable in some respects. 
With respect to the use of the term in Gerber’s advertisements, it cannot be said 
that the term reasonably misleads consumers. . . . Statements such as . . . 
“[n]utritionally, you can’t buy a better food than Gerber,” . . . add little to the 
daily informational barrage to which consumers are exposed. These statements 
fall within the supermarket sales pitch; they address such a large market that 
they bespeak caution, and should put the reasonable consumer on alert that the 
comments are meaningless sales patter. 
Id. at *8. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Jane Akre, Public Outcry Keeps Hormone Milk Labels in Pennsylvania, RACHEL’S 
DEMOCRACY & HEALTH NEWS, Jan. 24, 2008. 
 144. Andrew Martin, Consumers Won’t Know What They’re Missing, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 
11, 2007, § 3, at 8, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/11/business/11feed (last 
visited Dec. 3, 2009). 
 145. Andrew Martin, Fighting on a Battlefield the Size of a Milk Label, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 
9, 2008, at BU-7. This author questions whether absence labeling bans could withstand the 
scrutiny announced in 44 Liquormart: “The First Amendment directs us to be especially 
skeptical of regulations that seek to keep people in the dark for what the government 
perceives to be their own good.” 44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 503 (1996). 
Perhaps this is why the FDA and FTC refused to ban GMO absence labeling when 
petitioned to do so by Monsanto. See infra notes 251-52 and accompanying text. 
 146. Marion Burros, More House Salads, Whether the House Likes It or Not, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 16, 2008. 
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growth hormone, or rBGH, is injected into dairy cows to artificially 
increase their milk production. The hormone has not been properly tested 
for safety. Milk labeled rBGH-free is produced by dairy cows that never 
received injections of this hormone.”147    
This pronouncement did not escape the ire of dairy industry lobbyists, 
who demanded that the web site be changed—which it has.148  
So, while Congress sips rBGH-free milk in its own cafeteria, for the rest 
of us, rBGH labeling is voluntary, and in some states, rBGH absence 
labeling is forbidden. Considering, however, the fact that rBGH milk is 
banned in much of the world149 (as well as the congressional cafeteria), the 
GAO’s recommendation that it not be approved, and the many studies 
warning of its dangers, it seems that the American consumer is justified in 
wanting to know whether his milk was produced with rBGH. 
III.  THE FDA’S REGULATION OF FOOD LABELING 
A. The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA)  
The FDA’s authority to regulate food labeling derives from the Food, 
Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938. Section 403 of the FDCA provides that a 
food shall be deemed misbranded if “its labeling is false or misleading in 
any particular . . . .”150 Section 201 provides that in determining whether a 
label is misleading,  
there shall be taken into account (among other things) . . . the 
extent to which the labeling or advertising fails to reveal facts 
material in the light of such representations or material with 
respect to consequences which may result from the use of the 
article to which the labeling . . . relates under the conditions of 
use prescribed in the labeling . . . thereof or under such 
conditions of use as are customary or usual.151 
Section 201 has two prongs. First, it requires that if a manufacturer opts to 
tell something about its product, it must tell the whole truth and provide all 
                                                                                                                           
 147. Id. 
 148. The web site now reads: “Milk produced without synthetic rBGH is produced by 
dairy cows that never received injections of synthetic bovine growth hormone.” Id. 
 149. Peters & Lambert, supra note 26, at 173. 
 150. 21 U.S.C. § 343 (1938). 
 151. 21 U.S.C. § 321(n) (1938). 
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of the material information.152 Second, it requires disclosure of facts that are 
“material” to the “consequences” of consuming a food.153 
B. The FDA’s Interpretation of the FDCA 
Under the current FDA policy, a fact is only considered material in two 
contexts: when it relates to an increased risk to consumer safety;154 or when 
it relates to a “material consequence,” such as a change in a food’s 
organoleptic,155 nutritional, or functional properties “that would not be 
noticeable at the point of purchase but could be apparent when consumed or 
cooked.”156 Of course, whether there is an increased risk to consumer safety 
is determined by the regulator, and that decision will receive deference 
from a reviewing court because the reasoning behind labeling decisions are 
“characterized by scientific and technological uncertainty.”157 
However, the FDA has not always held that materiality is a condition 
precedent to considering consumer interest. As discussed supra Part II.B.2, 
the FDA has previously mandated labeling, based solely on consumer 
interest. In its 1986 decision to mandate labeling for all irradiated food, the 
FDA stated, “Whether information is material under section 201(n) of the 
act depends not on the abstract worth of the information but on whether 
consumers view such information as important and whether the omission of 
label information may mislead a consumer.”158 The FDA reasoned that the 
“FDA has historically required the disclosure of a food processing agent 
whenever it is material to the processing of foods.”159 It reasoned that if 
flour must be labeled as “bleached” when bleaching agents are used in 
processing, or as “bromated” when potassium bromate is used in the 
                                                                                                                           
 152. Degnan, supra note 15, at 20. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. at 8 (citing 49 Fed. Reg. 13679 (Apr. 6, 1984) (pertaining to the FDA 
requirement in 21 C.F.R. § 101.17(d)(1) that a special warning statement appear on the label 
of protein products intended for use in weight reduction due to health risks associated with 
very low calorie diets)). 
 155. An organoleptic difference is one capable of being detected by a human sense 
organ. Stauber v. Shalala, 895 F. Supp. 1178, 1193 (W.D. Wis. 1995).  
 156. Id.; see also Irradiation in the Production, Processing and Handling of Food, 72 Fed. 
Reg. 16,291, 16,293 (FDA proposed Apr. 4, 2007). 
 157. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Costle, 578 F.2d 337, 339 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
 158. Irradiation in the Production, Processing, and Handling of Food, 51 Fed. Reg. 
13,376, 13,388 (FDA Apr. 18, 1986) (emphasis added). 
 159. Id. 
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processing, then irradiated food should be labeled as irradiated, if 
irradiation is used in processing.160 
The FDA also gave other examples where it has mandated labeling, not 
because of the “abstract worth of the information,” i.e., safety concerns or 
organoleptic changes, but rather based solely on “whether consumers view 
such information as important and whether the omission of label 
information may mislead a consumer.”161 The FDA noted that it had 
required labeling where a food is enriched or fortified, where orange juice 
is made from a previously concentrated ingredient, or where orange juice 
has been pasteurized.162 The FDA further noted that manufacturers of 
“[p]otato chips made from dehydrated potatoes, onion rings made from 
minced onions, and fish sticks made from minced fish are all required to 
disclose these material differences in processing.”163  
The FDA has also proposed mandating labeling due to religious and 
cultural concerns.164 Consumers asked the FDA, for religious and cultural 
reasons, to require that labels state whether a protein hydrolysate is derived 
from animals or plants.165 The FDA recognized that, “for religious or 
cultural reasons, some consumers wish to avoid foods or food ingredients 
that are of animal origin because their dietary convictions prohibit or 
discourage the consumption of such foods.”166 The FDA, therefore, 
proposed a rule that would mandate labeling, concluding, “[T]he food 
source of a protein hydrolysate is information of material importance for a 
person who desires to avoid certain foods for religious or cultural 
reasons.”167 The FDA later backtracked on this proposed rule.168 
If the FDA requires labeling in all of these situations, then it would seem 
perfectly consistent for the FDA to require labeling of GMOs, or of milk 
from cows that have been treated with rBGH. Thus, while the FDA 
currently claims that it does not have authority under the FDCA to mandate 
labeling based solely on consumer interest, this seems a dubious claim.169 
                                                                                                                           
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Food Labeling; Declaration of Ingredients, 56 Fed. Reg. 28,592, 28,600 (FDA 
proposed June 21, 1991).  
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. (emphasis added). 
 168. See supra notes 137-40 and accompanying text. 
 169. Accord Streiffer & Rubel, supra note 22, at 68 (“[C]laiming that the FDA’s 
authority is limited to requiring those kinds of information is inconsistent with the plain 
language of the FDCA itself.”) (internal citations omitted); McGarity supra note 30, at 139 
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C. When Is a Label Misleading?: Legal Challenges to FDA Labeling 
Policy 
 1. Chevron Deference 
Stauber v. Shalala and Alliance for Bio-Integrity v. Shalala, discussed 
infra, demonstrate the deference that courts afford administrative agencies. 
An agency’s statutory interpretation does not receive deference when 
Congress has spoken directly to the issue; in such a case, the will of 
Congress must be given effect.170 However, where Congress has not 
specifically addressed the issue, agencies receive considerable deference; a 
court does not substitute its own judgment, but merely decides whether the 
agency’s answer is “based on a permissible construction of the statute.”171 
Further, courts give “substantial deference” when an agency is interpreting 
its own enabling statute.172 Additionally, agency decisions requiring 
scientific judgment receive even further judicial deference.173 And finally, 
common law rules of evidence require that reviewing courts confine 
themselves to the record that was before the agency, which forecloses 
challengers from bringing additional evidence showing the need for 
labeling.174 Taken together, as demonstrated in Stauber and Alliance for 
Bio-Integrity, these rules stack the deck overwhelmingly in favor of the 
regulator. As a result, as the following cases demonstrate, any agency 
policy that is challenged in court is almost certain to be upheld. 
 2. Central Hudson Scrutiny 
Regulation of food labels is a restriction on commercial speech, which 
must meet the Central Hudson test. Under Central Hudson Gas & Electric 
Corp. v. Public Service Commission, a court reviewing government 
restriction on food labeling must determine: “(1) whether the expression 
concerns lawful activity and is not misleading; (2) whether the 
                                                                                                                           
(arguing that the FDA could mandate labeling based solely on the fact that without a GMO 
label, a food will appear to be something that it is not, i.e, a food derived from non-
engineered plants); see discussion infra Part IV.A. But see Degnan, supra note 15, at 27 
(arguing that the FDA does not have authority to mandate labeling unless it determines that 
there is a safety concern). 
 170. “First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise 
question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, 
as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.” 
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984). 
 171. Id. 
 172. Alliance for Bio-Integrity v. Shalala, 116 F. Supp. 2d 166, 177 (D.D.C. 2000). 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. 
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government’s interest is substantial; (3) whether the labeling law directly 
serves the asserted interest; and (4) whether the labeling law is no more 
extensive than necessary.”175 The burden of proof is on the defendant to 
justify its labeling restriction, and that burden is not slight.176 Thus, 
legislatures receive scrutiny, while unelected bureaucrats receive 
deference.177 
This Part will next review three examples of labeling decisions that were 
subjected to judicial review. In the following examples, the FDA’s labeling 
decisions will receive deference and be upheld, while a state legislature’s 
labeling decision will receive scrutiny and be overturned. 
 3. Stauber v. Shalala 
In Stauber v. Shalala, a group of milk consumers challenged the FDA’s 
refusal to require mandatory labeling of milk from rBGH-injected cows.178 
Plaintiffs argued that consumer interest alone could suffice to justify 
mandatory labeling.179 The court refused to hear evidence of the danger of 
rBGH that had not been presented to the FDA.180 Applying an arbitrary and 
capricious standard of review, it held that a finding of a material difference 
is a condition precedent to considering consumer interest.181 Consumer 
interest is only relevant upon 
a determination that a product differs materially from the type of 
product it purports to be. If there is a difference, and consumers 
would likely want to know about the difference, then labeling is 
appropriate. . . . In the absence of evidence of a material 
difference between rBST-derived milk and ordinary milk, the 
use of consumer demand as the rationale for labeling would 
violate the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.182 
The court cited no authority for this proposition except to note that this was 
the opinion of the FDA.183 Thus, the Stauber court, following controlling 
                                                                                                                           
 175. Int’l Dairy Foods Ass’n v. Amestoy, 92 F.3d 67, 72 (2d Cir. 1996) (citing Central 
Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 562-63 (1980)). 
 176. Id. 
 177. See supra Part III.C.1. 
 178. Stauber v. Shalala, 895 F. Supp. 1178, 1182 (W.D. Wis. 1995). 
 179. Id. at 1193. 
 180. Id. at 1189. 
 181. Id. at 1193. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Stauber, 895 F. Supp. at 1193. The court did not discuss the FDA’s 1986 assertion 
that it had authority to label solely on the basis of consumer interest. See generally id. 
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U.S. Supreme Court precedent regarding deference to agencies, elevated an 
informal FDA policy to a rule of law: the FDA may not consider consumer 
interest in labeling decisions unless it first determines that a product differs 
materially from the type of product it purports to be.184  
 4. Alliance for Bio-Integrity v. Shalala 
In Alliance for Bio-Integrity v. Shalala, a coalition of groups and 
individuals, including scientists and religious leaders concerned about 
genetically altered foods, challenged the FDA’s refusal to require 
mandatory labeling of GMOs as arbitrary and capricious.185 They also 
raised challenges under the Free Exercise Clause and Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act (“RFRA”).186 The “[p]laintiffs produced several documents 
showing significant disagreements among scientific experts” regarding the 
safety of GMOs.187 Like Stauber, however, the court confined itself to the 
record that was before the agency.188 
The plaintiffs argued that in its labeling decision, the “FDA should have 
considered the widespread consumer interest in having genetically 
engineered foods labeled, as well as the special concerns of religious groups 
and persons with allergies in having these foods labeled.”189 The court held, 
however, that the FDA’s exclusion of consumer interest from the factors 
that determine whether a change is “material” constitutes a reasonable 
interpretation of the statute, and therefore is valid.190 The court cited to 
Stauber, opining that a finding of a material difference is a condition 
precedent to considering consumer interest.191 It therefore held that because 
the “FDA has already determined that, in general, rDNA modification does 
not ‘materially’ alter foods . . . . [Thus,] the FDA lacks a basis upon which 
it can legally mandate labeling, regardless of the level of consumer 
demand.”192 Thus, what began as an informal FDA policy became the rule 
of law in the influential D.C. Circuit.  
The court rejected the Free Exercise argument, citing Employment 
Division v. Smith, because, it said, the FDA’s policy was a neutral law of 
                                                                                                                           
 184. Id. 
 185. Alliance for Bio-Integrity v. Shalala, 116 F. Supp. 2d 166, 170 (D.D.C. 2000).  
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. at 177. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. at 178. 
 190. Id. at 179. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. (footnote omitted). 
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general applicability.193 The court also rejected the RFRA challenge 
because the plaintiff’s religious beliefs were not “substantially 
burdened.”194 
 5. International Dairy Foods Association v. Amestoy   
In International Dairy Foods Association v. Amestoy, a group of dairy 
manufacturers brought First Amendment and Commerce Clause challenges 
to a Vermont statute requiring dairy manufacturers to identify products 
which were, or might have been, derived from dairy cows treated with a 
synthetic growth hormone used to increase milk production.195 The Amestoy 
court gave little deference to the Vermont legislature,196 holding that it had 
not satisfied the second prong of the Central Hudson test, which requires 
that the state have a substantial interest in regulating the commercial 
speech.197 The court held that “consumer curiosity alone is not a strong 
enough state interest to sustain the compulsion of even an accurate, factual 
statement.”198 The court reasoned that if consumer interest alone were 
enough to compel labeling, there would be no end to the information 
manufacturers may be required to disclose.199 The court suggested that 
instead “consumers interested in such information should exercise the 
power of their purses by buying products from manufacturers who 
voluntarily reveal it.”200  
In a vigorous dissent, Judge Pierre Leval argued that Vermont’s concern 
was substantial and went beyond mere consumer interest, including: 
(1) They consider the use of a genetically-engineered hormone in 
the production unnatural; (2) they believe that use of the 
hormone will result in increased milk production and lower milk 
prices, thereby hurting small dairy farmers; (3) they believe that 
                                                                                                                           
 193. “Because it is not disputed that the Statement of Policy is neutral and generally 
applicable, Plaintiff’s Free Exercise Claim must fail.” Id. at 179-80 (citing Emp. Div. v. 
Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990)). 
 194. “While the Court recognizes the potential inconvenience the lack of labeling 
presents for Plaintiffs, Defendant’s decision to mandate labeling of genetically modified 
foods does not ‘substantially’ burden Plaintiffs’ religious beliefs.” Id. at 181. 
 195. Int’l Dairy Foods Assoc. v. Amestoy, 92 F.3d 67 (2d Cir. 1996). 
 196. McGarity, supra note 30, at 146. 
 197. Amestoy, 92 F.3d at 73. One wonders if the result would have been different if it had 
been the FDA requiring labeling, rather than the Vermont legislature. The FDA would have 
been entitled to Chevron deference. See supra Part III.C.1. 
 198. Amestoy, 92 F.3d at 74. 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. 
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the use of rBST is harmful to cows and potentially harmful to 
humans; and, (4) they feel that there is a lack of knowledge 
regarding the long-term effects of rBST.201  
Leval argued, “The mere fact that [Vermont] does not know whether 
rBST poses hazards is sufficient reason to justify disclosure by reason of 
the unknown potential for harm.”202 He pointed out that while the FDA’s 
studies of rBST may have been thorough, “they could not cover long-term 
effects of rBST on humans.”203  
He argued that the primary function of the First Amendment is to 
“advance truthful disclosure.”204 The true objective of the plaintiffs, Leval 
argued, is “concealment,” which “has little entitlement to protection under 
the First Amendment.”205  
The real issue, Leval wrote, is “whether the First Amendment prohibits 
government from requiring disclosure of truthful relevant information to 
consumers.”206 To invoke the First Amendment to invalidate a law 
requiring disclosure of information to consumers, Leval argued, “stands the 
Amendment on its ear.”207 Leval detailed at length the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s commitment to “the free flow of commercial information,” citing 
Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 
Inc., and 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island.208 
Leval also took issue with the majority’s contention that “because the 
FDA has not found health risks in this new procedure, health worries could 
not be considered ‘real’ or ‘cognizable.’”209   
[T]here are many possible reasons why a government agency 
might fail to find real health risks, including inadequate time and 
budget for testing, insufficient advancement of scientific 
techniques, insufficiently large sampling populations, pressures 
from industry, and simple human error. 
 To suggest that a government agency’s failure to find a 
health risk in a short-term study of a new genetic technology 
                                                                                                                           
 201. Id. at 75-76 (Leval, J., dissenting). 
 202. Id. at 76. 
 203. Id. 
 204. Id. at 80. 
 205. Id. 
 206. Id. 
 207. Id. at 74. 
 208. Id. at 80-81 (citing 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996); Va. 
State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976)). 
 209. Id. 
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should bar a state from requiring simple disclosure of the use of 
that technology where its citizens are concerned about such 
health risks would be unreasonable and dangerous.210 
Leval pointed out the government’s poor track record in determining 
product safety.211 He reasoned that “a government agency’s conclusion 
regarding a product’s safety, reached after limited study, is not a guarantee 
and does not invalidate public concern for unknown side effects.”212 
Finally, Leval comforted himself by noting the narrowness of the holding: 
“it applies only to cases where a state disclosure requirement is supported 
by no interest other than the gratification of consumer curiosity.”213 
The plaintiffs in Amestoy also argued that the Vermont statute violated 
the Commerce Clause because the mandatory labeling would impede the 
free flow of interstate commerce.214 While the court did not reach the 
Commerce Clause argument, the Commerce Clause may prove a potent 
obstacle to consumers’-right-to-know labeling laws at the state level.215 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
A.  Can FDA Mandate Food Labeling Based Solely on Consumer Interest? 
In 1986, the answer was yes. At that time, the FDA claimed authority 
under sections 403(a), 201(n), and 409 of the FDCA to mandate food 
labeling based on consumer interest alone.216 In 1994, the FDA said the 
answer was no, and this has been elevated to a rule of law.217 Had the 1986 
irradiation decision to mandate labeling of irradiated food been challenged 
in court, the FDA presumably would have argued that consumer interest is 
sufficient to give it the authority to mandate labeling under the FDCA. The 
reviewing court would have applied the same deference as the Stauber 
court and the Alliance for Bio-Integrity court, and as a result, the 1986 
policy would have been elevated to a rule of law. But unfortunately for 
                                                                                                                           
 210. Id. at 77. 
 211. “In studying the frequency and seriousness of risks identified after approval, GAO 
found that of the 198 drugs approved by FDA between 1976 and 1985 for which data were 
available, 102 (or 51.5 percent) had serious post-approval risks, as evidenced by labeling 
changes or withdrawal from the market.” Id. at 77. 
 212. Id. 
 213. Id. at 81. 
 214. Id. at 69 (majority opinion). 
 215. Id. at 70. 
 216. See supra Part II.B.2; see also Irradiation in the Production, Processing, and 
Handling of Food, 51 Fed. Reg. 13,376, 13,388 (FDA Apr. 18, 1986). 
 217. See supra Part III. 
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consumer rights advocates, that did not happen. This raises the question, 
was the FDA wrong in 1986, or has it just changed its mind? Why did the 
FDA change policies from 1986 to 1994?218  
In 2007, the FDA answered this question as it explained why it was 
proposing to reverse its 1986 policy, which mandated labeling of irradiated 
foods.219 The FDA stated, “In the past, FDA policies on irradiation labeling 
have focused on the fact that the food has been processed. . . . In recent 
years, FDA policies on the labeling of foods have focused on the results of 
the processing of the food rather than the processing itself.”220 Thus, the 
FDA’s turnaround on irradiated food labeling was triggered by a shift in 
policy, not by a lack of jurisdiction under the FDCA. The FDA has not 
argued that its 1986 policy was wrong, only that it has shifted its focus. The 
conclusion, therefore, is that the 1986 policy was a permissible 
interpretation of the FDCA; the FDA does have authority to mandate 
labeling based on consumer interest.221 
While the FDA’s labeling policy may have changed, the FDCA has not. 
Thus, if the FDCA allowed the FDA to make labeling policy on the basis of 
consumer interest in 1986, then it has the legal authority to do so today. It 
may be unwilling to do so for various reasons, but it is disingenuous for the 
FDA to claim that it does not have authority under the FDCA to do so,222 
since it has claimed legal authority to do so in the past.223 
                                                                                                                           
 218. The FDA’s 1992 policy stated in Alliance for Bio-Integrity was the policy 
challenged in Stauber. See Stauber, 895 F. Supp. 1182, 1186 (W.D. Wis. 1995) (citing 
Interim Guidance on the Voluntary Labeling of Milk and Milk Products from Cows That 
Have Not Been Treated with Recombinant Bovine Somatotropin, 59 Fed Reg. 6279, 6280 
(FDA Feb. 10, 1994) (“In addition, the agency found that there was no significant difference 
between milk from treated and untreated cows and, therefore, concluded that under the 
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (the act), the agency did not have the authority in this 
situation to require special labeling for milk from rbST-treated cows.”)). 
 219. Irradiation in the Production, Processing and Handling of Food, 72 Fed. Reg. 
16,291, 16,295 (FDA Apr. 4, 2007). 
 220. Id. (emphasis added). 
 221. See supra note 158. 
 222. This was the FDA’s position in Stauber, 895 F. Supp. at 1193; see also Interim 
Guidance on the Voluntary Labeling of Milk and Milk Products from Cows That Have Not 
Been Treated with Recombinant Bovine Somatotropin, 59 Fed. Reg. 6279 (FDA Feb. 10, 
1994) (“In addition, the agency found that there was no significant difference between milk 
from treated and untreated cows and, therefore, concluded that under the Federal Food, 
Drug, and Cosmetic Act (the act), the agency did not have the authority in this situation to 
require special labeling for milk from rBST-treated cows.”). 
 223. See supra notes 93-97 and accompanying text. 
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One further question remains: the Stauber court and the Alliance for Bio-
Integrity court elevated the 1994 policy into a rule of law—does this mean 
that the FDA’s 1986 interpretation cannot be revived?  
Whether an agency that has been upheld by a court can reverse itself and 
still be entitled to Chevron deference is a question not yet addressed by the 
U.S. Supreme Court.224 However, we do know that agency decisions trump 
prior judicial interpretation, as long as they would otherwise qualify for 
Chevron deference.225 The FDA shifted its interpretation of the FDCA once 
from 1986 to 1994 and it was upheld—why could it not shift again? After 
all, regulators receive heightened deference when interpreting their own 
enabling statute.226 
Heightened deference, however, is no guarantee of success in court. The 
majority in Amestoy, for example, showed little regard for the Vermont 
legislature when the majority concluded that Vermont’s “sole interest” in 
passing its rBST labeling statute had been “consumer curiosity,” when in 
fact the people of Vermont had cited multiple reasons, including “concerns 
about human health, cow health, biotechnology, and the survival of small 
dairy farms of Vermont.”227 Given the judicial branch’s unpredictableness 
when it comes to deference, it is not clear whether the FDA could go back 
to its 1986 interpretation without being overturned. Advocates of the 
consumer’s right to know, therefore, would be wiser to seek relief in 
Congress, rather than the courts. If Congress amends the FDCA to require 
regulators to consider the consumer’s right to know, the FDA could no 
longer argue that it did not have authority to base labeling decision 
thereupon. 
                                                                                                                           
 224. Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Agency Action in 9 ENGAGE: J. FED. SOC. 
PRACTICE GROUPS 3, 18 (2008). 
 225. Id. (citing Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 
967, 982 (2005)). 
 226. See supra note 74. 
 227. See Int’l Dairy Foods Ass’n v. Amestoy, 92 F.3d 67, 76 (2nd Cir. 1996) (Leval, J., 
dissenting).  
[The majority] simply disregards the evidence of Vermont’s true interests and 
the district court's findings recognizing those interests. Nowhere does the 
majority opinion discuss or even mention the evidence or findings regarding 
the people of Vermont’s concerns about human health, cow health, 
biotechnology, and the survival of small dairy farms. 
Id. 
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B. Stauber, Alliance for Bio-Integrity, & Amestoy—Wrongly Decided?: A 
Critique 
The outcomes of Stauber and Alliance for Bio-Integrity were unfortunate 
for consumer rights advocates. However, both courts applied controlling 
precedent requiring substantial deference to agency decisions. When a court 
follows the law, it should be praised, not criticized. One could argue, 
however, that those courts should have considered the constitutional rights 
of a third party—the consumer.  
As Judge Leval argued in Amestoy, to use the First Amendment to deny 
“disclosure of information consumers reasonably desire stands the 
Amendment on its ear.”228 “The benefit the First Amendment confers in the 
area of commercial speech,” Leval argued, “is the provision of accurate, 
non-misleading, relevant information to consumers.”229 In light of the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s holdings in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia 
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., and 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 
Leval may be right.230  
In Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, the Court struck down a ban 
preventing pharmacies from advertising drug prices.231 The Court began its 
discussion with the principle that: “Freedom of speech presupposes a 
willing speaker. But where a speaker exists, . . . the protection afforded is to 
the communication, to its source and to its recipients both.”232 The Court 
reasoned that “information is not in itself harmful, that people will perceive 
their own best interests if only they are well enough informed, and that the 
best means to that end is to open the channels of communication rather than 
to close them.”233 The Court held that Virginia may not accomplish its 
interests by “keeping the public in ignorance . . . .”234  
While Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, which dealt with suppression 
of speech, is distinguishable from the question considered by this 
Comment—whether commercial speech can be compelled in the name of 
the consumer’s right to know—the principle is the same: the recipient of 
                                                                                                                           
 228. Id. at 74. 
 229. Id. at 81. 
 230. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 516 (1996); Va. State Bd. of 
Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976). 
 231. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 770. 
 232. Id. at 756 (emphasis added). 
 233. Id. at 770. 
 234. Id. 
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speech has a protected First Amendment interest and the government may 
not protect consumers by keeping them ignorant.235  
In 44 Liquormart, the Court struck down a state law that prevented 
liquor stores from advertising their prices.236 The Court reasoned that: 
The First Amendment directs us to be especially skeptical of 
regulations that seek to keep people in the dark for what the 
government perceives to be their own good. That teaching 
applies equally to state attempts to deprive consumers of 
accurate information about their chosen products: . . . “Some of 
the ideas and information are vital, some of slight worth. But the 
general rule is that the speaker and the audience, not the 
government, assess the value of the information presented.”237 
While 44 Liquormart, like Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, addressed a 
ban on speech, not compelled labeling, the Court in both cases opined that 
courts should be especially skeptical of regulations that seek to keep people 
in the dark for what the government perceives to be their own good.  
The Court has made clear, therefore, that recipients of commercial 
speech have a First Amendment right in receiving it, and courts should be 
skeptical of regulations that paternalistically prevent consumers from being 
provided with truthful information. The Stauber court and the Alliance for 
Bio-Integrity court can, therefore, be justifiably criticized for failing to 
consider the consumers’ First Amendment right to receive access to the 
speech they demanded. Under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 
a reviewing court must hold FDA regulations that violate the Constitution 
to be invalid.238 
There is considerable support, therefore, for the view that Stauber, 
Alliance for Bio-Integrity, and Amestoy were wrongly decided. However, 
while a consumer’s right to know might be protected by the First 
Amendment, no court has squarely held so. Future courts are unlikely to 
make the jurisprudential leap argued for by Judge Leval. It is much safer to 
follow the path of Stauber and Alliance for Bio-Integrity. Furthermore, state 
                                                                                                                           
 235. Id. 
 236. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 516 (1996). 
 237. Id. at 503-04 (emphasis added) (quoting Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 767 
(1993)). 
 238. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(B) (2006) (“The reviewing court shall . . . hold unlawful and 
set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be . . . contrary to constitutional 
right . . . .”). 
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legislatures are not the places to vindicate the consumer’s right to know, as 
Amestoy demonstrates.239 Congress, therefore, is the consumer’s best hope. 
V.  PROPOSAL 
Others have looked at individual situations where the consumer’s right to 
know has been denied and have proposed solutions that would only apply to 
those specific situations.240 This Comment proposes a global solution that 
would require food regulators to consider what consumers reasonably want 
to know in every food labeling decision. 
This Comment proposes that Congress, pursuant to its Commerce Clause 
power, amend section 201(n) of the FDCA to provide that: in determining 
whether a label is misleading, “there shall be taken into account the extent 
to which the labeling fails to reveal material facts that consumers 
reasonably desire to know . . . .” Admittedly, one can envision several 
criticisms of this proposal. This Part will attempt to anticipate and address 
the most obvious of them. 
A. Criticisms Addressed 
 1. A “Reasonably Desire” Standard Is Too Vague and Invites 
Litigation 
Critics will argue that the proposed statutory language is too vague—
how can a court determine whether a fact is one that consumers “reasonably 
desire to know”? What this critic desires is a bright line rule. However, not 
everything in law lends itself to a bright line rule. Tort law has its “ordinary 
person”; contract law has its implied obligation of “good faith effort”; and 
corporate law has its “business judgment rule.” All are vague standards; all 
invite litigation; yet all are deeply rooted in American law. Sometimes the 
law must eschew factors, bright line rules, and balancing tests in favor of 
reasonableness. It has done so successfully for hundreds of years; it can do 
so again here. 
                                                                                                                           
 239. See Int’l Dairy Foods Ass’n v. Amestoy, 92 F.3d 67, 70 (2d Cir. 1996). The 
interstate Commerce Clause may represent a potential barrier to the enactment and 
enforcement of state consumer right to know legislation. 
 240. See, e.g., Cusimano, supra note 113, at 1121-24 (proposing that Congress mandate 
labeling of rBST products); Emily Robertson, Note, Finding a Compromise in the Debate 
Over Genetically Modified Food: An Introduction to a Model State Consumer Right-To-
Know Act, 9 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 156, 170-76 (2003) (proposing a model act requiring 
disclosure of GMOs). 
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 2. There Will Be No End to the Amount of Information That 
Consumers Will Demand 
The majority in Amestoy argued that: 
Were consumer interest alone sufficient, there is no end to the 
information that states could require manufacturers to disclose 
about their production methods. For instance, with respect to 
cattle, consumers might reasonably evince an interest in knowing 
which grains herds were fed, with which medicines they were 
treated, or the age at which they were slaughtered.241 
Several responses are possible to this critique. First, one could respond—
so what? If consumers reasonably want to know it, an aversion to clutter is 
not a sufficient justification to deny them the access to pertinent 
information.  
Second, there is a limit to what consumers will demand. As discussed 
supra Part II, there are valid reasons why a consumer would want to know 
whether milk comes from rBGH-injected cows. As of yet, no bills have 
been proposed, no lawsuits have been filed, and no petitions have been 
drafted, to compel slaughter age labeling, as the Amestoy majority mused.242 
Thus, the concern of the Amestoy majority is likely a non-issue; consumers 
will clamor for labeling of facts that are actually important to them, not 
trivialities. 
Third, one could argue that this concern has a positive externality: the 
threat of compelled labeling will prevent manufacturers from putting things 
in their products that consumers would not want to consume. For example, 
the threat of compelled labeling might prevent liverwurst makers from 
including “snouts and ears” in their product.243 The free flow of 
information, aided by mandatory labeling, will make sellers more 
responsive to the desires of consumers—hardly a bad thing. 
                                                                                                                           
 241. Amestoy, 92 F.3d at 74. 
 242. Id. 
 243. See Community Nutrition Inst. v. Block, 749 F.2d 50, 57 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1984) 
(Scalia, Circuit J.).  
Frankfurter labeling need not include esophagus even in the statement of 
ingredients. The fastidious reader will be comforted to know, however, 
that snouts and ears cannot be included unless the product name contains 
the phrase “with variety meats” or “with by-products.” Not so, of course, 
with liver sausage (liverwurst), where one takes his chances. 
Id. (internal citations omitted). 
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 3. Voluntary Labeling Is Sufficient To Protect Consumer Interests 
The Amestoy majority argued that the consumer’s right to know can be 
vindicated by market forces—consumers “should exercise the power of 
their purses by buying products from manufacturers who voluntarily reveal 
it.”244 The case for voluntarily labeling is compelling.245 However, it 
ignores the ugly reality that industry vigorously fights voluntary labeling in 
order to protect its own interests. 
One dairy in Maine, citing the consumer’s right to know, labeled its 
milk, “Our farmer’s pledge: no artificial hormones.”246 Monsanto sued, 
arguing that the dairy’s label implied its milk was superior, an inference 
that harmed Monsanto’s business. That lawsuit was settled,247 but one can 
imagine the chilling effect on voluntary labeling.  
In Oregon, biotech corporations spent $5.3 million to successfully defeat 
a ballot initiative that would have required mandatory labeling of GMOs.248 
Proponents of the initiative were only able to raise $200,000.249 
In February 2007, Monsanto petitioned the Federal Trade Commission 
and the FDA to “stop deceptive milk labeling and advertising.”250 The 
request was denied.251 However, since then, Monsanto has sought to protect 
itself from voluntary labeling by lobbying for state legislative bans.252 In 
                                                                                                                           
 244. Amestoy, 92 F.3d at 74. 
 245. See, e.g., Peters & Lambert, supra note 26, at 174 (arguing that voluntary labeling 
enhances consumer autonomy at lower costs than a mandatory labeling scheme). 
 246. Kristen Philipkoski, Monsanto v. Oakhurst Dairy: Does Monsanto Corporation 
Have the Right to Keep You from Knowing the Contents of Your Food? (originally published 
in Wired Magazine, 2003), http://reclaimdemocracy.org/corporate_speech/monsanto_ 
oakhurst_wired.html.  
 247. “The case was settled in 2003 when Oakhurst agreed to include language on its 
labels that explains that the FDA had found no significant difference between milk from 
cows that were given the hormone, and those that did not get the hormone.” Stephen J. 
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2007, at P1D. 
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LEGAL DEBATE 178, 178-79 (Paul Weirich ed., 2007). 
 249. Id. at 179. 
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Advertising (Apr. 3, 2007), http://www.organicconsumers.org/artman2/uploads/1/FDA_ 
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 251. Kara Sissell, FTC Refuses Monsanto’s Request for Dairy Inquiry, CHEMICAL WK., 
Sept. 12, 2007, at 45. 
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October 2007, the Pennsylvania Agriculture Department, at Monsanto’s 
request, banned labeling milk as free from rBGH.253 However, in January 
2008, “a bombardment of consumer emails, letters and calls” persuaded the 
Governor to intervene and reverse the ban before it went into effect.254 As 
of March 2008, bans were being considered in New Jersey, Ohio, Indiana, 
Kansas, Utah, Missouri, and Vermont.255 Thus, one can see that voluntary 
labeling is not a viable solution. 
In August 2008, Monsanto agreed to sell its rBGH business to Eli 
Lilly.256 It remains to be seen whether Eli Lilly will continue Monsanto’s 
aggressive campaign against voluntary labeling. What is clear, however, is 
that when hundreds of millions of dollars in profits are on the line,257 the 
power of the purse alone is not sufficient to vindicate the consumer’s right 
to know. 
 4. Does It Pass the Central Hudson Test? 
The amendment to the FDCA proposed by this Comment would likely 
be considered a restriction on commercial speech, since, in some cases, it 
would force manufacturers to “speak” when they would prefer to remain 
silent. As discussed supra Part III.C.2, restrictions on commercial speech 
must pass the Central Hudson test: “(1) the food labeling regulation must 
concern lawful activity and not be misleading; (2) the government’s interest 
must be substantial; (3) the labeling law must directly serve the asserted 
interest; and (4) the labeling law must be no more extensive than 
necessary.”258  
Critics will argue that the proposed amendment would fail this test. 
However, as this Comment has laid out above, there are ample moral, 
ethical, religious, and health reasons why consumers might desire certain 
                                                                                                                           
Foods Ass’n v. Amestoy, 92 F.3d 67, 80 n.6 (2d Cir. 1996) (Leval, J., dissenting) (quoting 
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 253. Jane Akre, Public Outcry Keeps Hormone Milk Labels in PA, Jan. 19, 2008, 
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Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980)). 
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information to appear on a label.259 And, as the representative of the people, 
when consumer concerns are material and reasonable, the government can 
be said to have a substantial interest in mandating labeling. Even critics 
would likely agree that mandatory labeling would directly advance this 
interest. Further, if a mandatory labeling regulation is crafted reasonably, it 
should easily pass the fourth prong, which requires that the regulation be no 
more extensive than necessary. Therefore, it seems that the amendment to 
the FDCA proposed by this Comment would easily survive Central Hudson 
scrutiny. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Under the current law, regulators need not, and generally do not, 
consider consumer interest as a factor in deciding what must go on a label. 
However, the consumer’s right to know, which is rooted in the First 
Amendment, requires that this situation be rectified. Due to unfavorable 
jurisprudence in the courts of appeals, unsympathetic regulators, and 
Commerce Clause issues, consumer interest litigation is unlikely to rectify 
this problem. The best way to vindicate the consumer’s right to know, 
therefore, is for Congress to amend the FDCA to require regulators to take 
into account the extent to which the labeling fails to reveal material facts 
that consumers reasonably desire to know. 
Scientists will continue to develop more ways to manipulate food. These 
new technologies will continue to raise religious, moral, ethical, health, and 
safety issues. The consumer’s right to know about his food will be an 
increasingly important issue. While mandatory labeling is often contrary to 
the interests of the food industry, the U.S. Constitution has made the choice 
for us—the First Amendment requires the government to protect the 
consumer’s right to receive accurate, non-misleading information the 
consumer reasonably desires to know. 
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